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11 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Analysis Group

SUBJECT

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick SF#429 229

1. On 9 June 1969 (1) (1)
contacted Staff and Operations Branch/Operational Evaluation Section for information concerning Gerald Patrick HEMMING. was referred to the writer, who is holding the HEMMING file. When (1) contacted the writer, (1) advised that he is the action officer for a cable from the Guatemala Station) reporting an assassination plot on the life of President LAUGERUD of Guatemala. (1) was unfamiliar with the case of Gerald Patrick HEMMING and had not as yet reviewed the 201 file on HEMMING. (1) was requested to alert and JMWAVE to the below-mentioned cable and to provide the writer with a copy of the report coming in from the Guatemala Station?

- 2. provided the writer with a copy of the cable (IN 944357, i), dated 8 June 1976), which is attached. In substance, the cable reflects that circa 8 June 1976 a Guatemalan source, with the knowledge of Guatemalan President LAUGERUD, provided the Guatemala Station a written report, and a detailed briefing, concerning a plot to assassinate President LAUGERUD. According to the information the plot was to have been carried out on 15 September 1975; however, one of the major conspirators, Jorge Antonio "Cokie" ZIMERI Safie left Guatemala in August 1975 as a result of an attack upon his, ZIMERI's, life. ZIMERI has been living in Miami since August 1975.
- 3. According to the report, the National Liberation Movement was involved with ZIMERI in the assassination plot and ZIMERI in turn was involved with two Americans, brothers, Robert and Gerald Patrick HEMMING. The HEMMING brothers assisted ZIMERI in acquiring arms, among other things, which were flown to Guatemala in a small aircraft. The report also claims that ZIMERI has close relations with police officials in Miami and New Orleans.

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NOTE: The Guatemala Station also included information the Chief of Station had received from on 8 June. said that he had been providing information on ZIMERI to the Guatemalan government for the past six months or so. He claimed that two Americans were involved with ZIMERI, one of them who runs a guard service in Miami. | did not mention names but described one of the Americans as about six feet four inches and weighing about 230 pounds.

- 4. The Guatemalan report of the assassination plot ends with five requests for information by President LAUGERUD:
 - a. Is ZIMERI still in the United States?
 - b. In the event ZIMERI is not in the United States legally, deport him to Guatemala.
 - C. Is ZIMERI recruiting merceraries in the United States for possible use in Guatemala?
 - d. Does ZIMERI receive any kind of preferential treatment by U. S. authorities which permit him to carry firearms, as well as to purchase arms and ammunition for shipment to Guatemala?
 - e. Any information on Robert and Gerald HEMMING?
- 5. On 19 June 1976 advised that DDO is referring the entire matter to the FBI and State Department.
- Office of Security indices are negative in pertinent variations of the name of ZIMERI or Robert HEMMING.
- 7. From the name, physical description, activity, and alleged employment, it is apparent that Gerald Patrick HEMMING is identical with the subject of Office of Security file 429 229, who has been described as six-foot five, 250 pounds, who is a notorious mercenary and soldier of fortune and who as of May 1975 was ostensibly employed by a private investigation company, TEPCOL Security (Office of Security--no record) in Miami, Florida.

- 8. Gerald Patrick HEMMING is well known to this Agency, the Office of Security Miami Field Office, and JNWAVE. On numerous occasions since at least the early 1960's, HEMMING had claimed Agency affiliation when in fact there has been none. The most recent incident wherein HEMMING claimed such affiliation was in May 1975 when he volunteered his services to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Gerald Patrick HEMMING is a long-time cohort of Frank Anthony STURGIS (SF#353 459), aka: Frank FIORINI, of Watergate notoriety who also has a long-time record of falsely claiming Agency affiliation. In the late 1950's HEMMING and STURGIS, both former U.S. Marines, joined Fidel CASTRO in Cuba but returned shortly thereafter claiming disillusionment with the CASTRO cause. Soon thereafter, STURGIS organized a group of mercenaries for Caribbean and Central American activities which he named the International Anti-Communist Brigade. A reported sub-unit of this "Brigade" (the backers of whom have never been fully established) was named the Intercontinental Penetration Force, headed by Gerald Patrick HEMMING.
- 9. For an appreciation of the possible ramifications of a Guatemalan government expose of this assassination plot involving HENMING, you are referred to attachments to instant memorandum, to wit: a memorandum by the writer dated 10 June 1975 in the name of Frank STURGIS and Everett Howard HUNT, Jr.; and an extract from a book published in early 1976 written by Michael CANFIELD and Alan J. WEBERMAN. The book Coup d'etat in America--The CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy is a diatribe against the Agency and attempts to link the Agency with the assassination of President KENNEDY. One of the major links attempted by the authors is through Everett Howard HUNT, Jr. to Frank STURGIS to Gerald Patrick HENMING to Loran Eugene HALL. Loran Eugene HALL was a member of HEMMING's Intercontinental Penetration Force. Loran Eugene HALL received nationwide publicity in 1967 when New Orleans District Attorney "Jim" GARRISON alleged that HALL (and the Intercontinental Penetration Force) was involved in the assassination of President KENNEDY and that members of this unit were connected with CIA. GARRISON shortly thereafter dropped his interest in HALL, but it is interesting that he did so after Gerald Patrick HENMING and another cohort, Robert K. BROWN, joined GARRISON's investigation.

Jerry G. Brown
Deputy Chief
Security Analysis Group

11 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Analysis Group

SUBJECT

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick

SF#429 229

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- 7. From the name, physical description, activity, and alleged employment, it is apparent that Gerald Patrick HEMMING is identical with the subject of Office of Security file 429 229, who has been described as six-foot five, 250 pounds, who is a notorious mercenary and soldier of fortune and who as of May 1975 was ostensibly employed by a private investigation company, TEPCOL Security (Office of Security--no record) in Niami, Florida.

- 8. Gerald Patrick HEMMING is well known to this Agency, the Office of Security Miami Field Office, and JNWAVE. On numerous occasions since at least the early 1960's, HEMMING had claimed Agency affiliation when in fact there has been none. The most recent incident wherein HEMMING claimed such affiliation was in May 1975 when he volunteered his services to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Gerald Patrick HEMMING is a long-time cohort of Frank Anthony STURGIS (SF#353 459), aka: Frank FIORINI, of Watergate notoriety who also has a long-time record of falsely claiming Agency affiliation. In the late 1950's HEMMING and STURGIS, both former U.S. Marines, joined Fidel CASTRO in Cuba but returned shortly thereafter claiming disillusionment with the CASTRO cause. Soon thereafter, STURGIS organized a group of mercenaries for Caribbean and Central American activities which he named the International Anti-Communist Brigade. A reported sub-unit of this "Brigade" (the backers of whom have never been fully established) was named the Intercontinental Penetration Force, headed by Gerald Patrick HEMMING.
- 9. For an appreciation of the possible ramifications of a Guatemalan government expose of this assassination plot involving HENMING, you are referred to attachments to instant memorandum, to wit: a memorandum by the writer dated 10 June 1975 in the name of Frank STURGIS and Everett Howard HUNT, Jr.; and an extract from a book published in early 1976 written by Michael CANFIELD and Alan J. WEBERMAN. The book Coup d'etat in America--The CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy is a diatribe against the Agency and attempts to link the Agency with the assassination of President KENNEDY. One of the major links attempted by the authors is through Everett Howard HUNT, Jr. to Frank STURGIS to Gerald Patrick HENMING to Loran Eugene HALL. Loran Eugene HALL was a member of HEMMING's Intercontinental Penetration Force. Loran Eugene HALL received nationwide publicity in 1967 when New Orleans District Attorney "Jim" GARRISON alleged that HALL (and the Intercontinental Penetration Force) was involved in the assassination of President KENNEDY and that members of this unit were connected with CIA. GARRISON shortly thereafter dropped his interest in HALL, but it is interesting that he did so after Gerald Patrick HEMMING and another cohort, Robert K. BROWN, joined GARRISON's investigation.

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